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Abstract
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1 Introduction
Looking back at the recent financial crisis, it appears that not only shareholders of banks but also
investors of insurer stocks were hit hard by the turmoil in international stock markets. In fact,
insurer stocks suﬀered even higher losses than stocks of banks. The question remains what exactly
caused stocks of insurers to experience such massive declines. In this paper, we analyze whether
the abnormal movements in insurer stock prices can be explained by investor sentiment that in-
tensified during the financial crisis. More precisely, we argue that investors were measuring both
banks and insurance companies by the same yardstick during the crisis and exited stock invest-
ments of financial institutions indiscriminately and regardless of the institutions’ actual exposure
to the crisis. If this were the case, investors would have been punishing insurers beyond the de-
gree to which they were actually exposed to the adverse eﬀects of a crisis that originated from the
banking sector.
Intuitively, we would expect insurers to be less aﬀected than banks by the financial cri-
sis for several reasons: First, insurers are neither vulnerable to bank runs by depositors (see
Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) and creditors (see Duﬃe, 2010; Gorton and Metrick, 2012) nor to
liquidity shortages arising from the interbank market as seen during the financial crisis. On the
contrary, insurer stocks should experience a flight to quality during an episode of turmoil in the
financial sector as investors exit their investments in volatile bank stocks. However, the near-
collapse of American International Group led to a reassessment of the insurance sector’s potential
to cause systemic risk and thus potentially causing investor sentiment to increase during the finan-
cial crisis. At the same time, the question why investors punished insurer stocks to such a high
extent, especially non-life insurers that were economically less aﬀected by the crisis, still remains
unanswered. Insurance providers guarantee protection against future losses and thus, allow firms
to take on their desired level of risks. However, insurance companies are not as interconnected
and systemically important in functioning economy as banks (see Chen et al., 2014). Therefore,
our study helps in understanding the eﬀects of the financial crisis on insurers by studying if noise
trading and sentiment were the driving forces for the stock downturn in this relatively uninvolved
sector.
We first test whether the time-varying presence of uninformed traders in the market caused
insurer stocks to be more volatile, as it is predicted by theory (see De Long et al., 1990). Using a
direct measure of retail investor attention on individual stocks based on internet search volume data
from Google’s search engine, we show that a higher level of investor attention is indeed associated
with more stock price volatility. Further, we confirm the findings in Da et al. (2011) that abnormal
retail investor attention increases prices in the next week, followed by a price reversal the weeks
afterwards. Finally, we investigate the eﬀect of market-wide sentiment on the cross-section of
insurer stocks by running separate analyses for diﬀerent types of insurers accounting for individual
arbitrage opportunities.
In this paper, we argue that insurer stock returns and volatility during the financial crisis were
significantly driven by irrational components such as general negative investor sentiment. To proxy
for an individual insurer’s susceptibility to the adverse eﬀects of the crisis as perceived by market
investors, we employ new measures of “crisis sentiment” based on internet search volume data.
First, we use the first principal component of several Google search volumes for crisis-related
queries (e.g., “financial crisis”, “subprime crisis”) to measure the level of market-wide crisis sen-
timent as proposed in Irresberger et al. (2015). Additionally, we employ the FEARS-index intro-
duced in Da et al. (2015) as a variable that represents household-level sentiment. To measure the
extent of idiosyncratic crisis sentiment, we employ the abnormal search volume on a firm’s ticker
symbol as a proxy of retail investor attention (see Da et al., 2011) and the correlation of such id-
iosyncratic search volume with market-level crisis sentiment. Thus, we also capture the degree to
which investors are negatively influenced by the financial crisis in their perception of the insur-
ance market. We estimate our proposed measure of crisis sentiment for a sample of U.S. insurance
companies and carry out regressions of weekly stock returns and volatility on the new measures
of crisis sentiment. To account for the diﬀerent levels of exposure to the crisis, we run separate
regressions for the diﬀerent types of insurance companies.
Our results show that our measure of market-level (or general) crisis sentiment is significantly
2
negatively correlated with insurers’ stock returns and positively related to volatility. Further, crisis
sentiment also aﬀects the cross-section of insurers’ stock return volatility, e.g., larger insurers are
less aﬀected by market-wide sentiment. The impact of crisis sentiment is strongest on non-life
insurers which were only weakly exposed to the negative eﬀects of the crisis. Higher values of
abnormal investor attention on an individual insurer induces higher stock price volatility in the
next week followed by a reversal in the weeks after, but not vice versa. The relation of individual
investor attention and market-wide sentiment to stock returns and volatility, however, is weak.
Consequently, (retail) investors did indeed act on the sentiment of a general economic downturn
rather than a diﬀerential and rational assessment of the idiosyncratic exposure of insurers to the
crisis.
Our paper is related to few but influential previous studies on the usefulness of internet search
data.1 Ginsberg et al. (2009) were among the first to use search engine queries to detect health
trends and predict influenza epidemics. In an economic context, the usefulness of Google search
volume data for portfolio diversification and investment strategies has recently been investigated
by Kristoufek (2013) and Preis et al. (2013). Methodically, our empirical approach diﬀers from
theirs in that we make use of the search volume index (SVI) provided by Google Trends while
Ginsberg et al. (2009) compute a time series of weekly counts for the most common search queries
themselves. The usefulness of quantifying internet search behaviour has also been studied in the
finance literature, most notably through the work of Da et al. (2011) and Da et al. (2015). In the lat-
ter, the authors also study investor sentiment measured through internet search behaviour but focus
on the pricing of financial assets. Their approach resembles ours with respect to the construction of
a new index of investor sentiment. Their so called FEARS index is based on the SVI of sentiment
revealing search terms such as “recession” or “bankruptcy”, which they find to increase in the years
around the financial crisis. However, Da et al. (2015) focus on the eﬀect investor sentiment has on
asset prices, volatility, and fund flow from equity mutual funds to bond funds. Our paper diﬀers
significantly from previous studies, however, as we measure the correlation between two sets of
1 As noted by Choi and Varian (2009), search data from Google may have the potential to describe interest in a
variety of economic variables.
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search terms and provide the first use of big data from Google in the empirical insurance litera-
ture. In addition, our work also complements the findings on the relation between investor mood
and asset prices (see, e.g., Shu, 2010). But instead of using mood proxies, such as biorhythms or
wheather, we employ a direct measure of the bearish sentiment of investors. Finally, our paper is
also related to the recent study by Wisniewski and Lambe (2013) which examines the impact of
negative media speculation on the performance of bank sector indices. In contrast to their paper,
we refine the notion of negative sentiment by analyzing crisis sentiment and concentrate on the
consequences for individual insurers rather than the whole financial sector.
The rest of our paper is structured as follows. We provide an overview of the most relevant
literature that we use to build our hypotheses in Section 2. In Section 3, we briefly describe the
construction of our data sample, followed by an outline of the measures we employ to proxy for
investor attention and sentiment and other variables used in this study. Section 4 presents the results
of our empirical analysis into the question whether insurer stock prices and volatility during the
crisis was driven by crisis sentiment and retail investor attention. Afterwards, we discuss several
robustness tests in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
2 Literature overview and hypothesis building
The literature on the interplay of heterogeneous investor attention, sentiment, and asset
pricing is vast and still growing (see, e.g., Merton, 1987; Gervais et al., 2001; Sims, 2003;
Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003; Seasholes and Wu, 2007; Tetlock, 2007; Barber and Odean, 2008;
Hou et al., 2009). Since the introduction of the noise trading hypothesis by Black (1986) that
explains why expected actual stock prices may diﬀer from their expected funndamental value,
several studies have empirically analyzed the impact of positive or negative sentiment and noise
trading on the valuation of stocks. The presence of uninformed noise traders in financial markets
may lead to unexpected movements in prices and make the valuation of assets even more diﬃcult.2
2 Further, in the presence of short-sale contrainsts, overconfident noise traders could drive informed or institutional
traders out of the market completely, as shown by the model of Baker and Stein (2004).
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In our study, we measure time-varying retail investor attention as proposed by Da et al. (2011) and
investigate its impact on the predictability of insurer stock prices. The model of De Long et al.
(1990) suggests that the presence of uninformed trading leads to an increase in asset price
volatility. Consequently, the first hypothesis that we test in our study reads as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Higher retail investor attention leads to higher levels of volatility in the short term.
Stocks of financial firms are special in the way that investors often incorporate the rela-
tively high importance of these institutions for large parts of the economy (e.g., banks’ lending
activities) into asset prices. Due to their vital function for the economy, financial institutions have
benefitted from being “too-big-to-fail” and receiving (implicit) bailout guarantees from govern-
ments, which could also be reflected in the pricing of their stocks (see, e.g., Gandhi and Lustig,
2015; Schweikhard and Tsesmelidakis, 2014). While there is some evidence that insurance
companies were victims of the crisis rather than perpetrators (see Chen et al., 2014), there is still
no consensus about the mechanisms that caused insurer stock prices to drop to such an extent
as they did during the crisis. In this study, we provide evidence that market-wide and individual
crisis sentiment aﬀected insurer stock prices negatively and made their valuation more diﬃcult
during the crisis. The impact of market-level crisis sentiment but also the individual association of
banks with the financial crisis on the prices of bank stocks have been analyzed by Irresberger et al.
(2015). We extend their study by investigating the importance of co-movement of retail investor
attention on insurers’ equities and crisis sentiment for the predictability of insurer stock prices.
We suspect the following statement to be true:
Hypothesis 2: The association of individual insurers with the crisis is positively related to
volatility and negatively related to stock returns.
In line with the arguments in Baker and Wurgler (2006), we expect market-wide sentiment
to increase the overall level of aggregate uncertainty about prices. Further, due to diﬀerences in
their business models and involvement with the crisis, sentiment is supposed to not only aﬀect the
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overall level of price volatility, but also to aﬀect the cross-section of insurer stocks. We test the
following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3a: Sentiment waves have a diﬀerential eﬀect on the cross-section of insurance firms
and possess an idiosyncratic component.
First, we account for diﬀerences in arbitrage opportunities for the diﬀerent insurer stocks
and test how crisis sentiment aﬀects the individual stocks. Second, we split our sample of U.S.
insurers into diﬀerent sub-samples and thus, indirectly control for the actual exposure to the
elements of the crisis. Specifically, we test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3b: Insurers that were more exposed to the adverse eﬀects of the crisis are less
aﬀected by crisis sentiment.
In the next section, we describe the construction of our sample of U.S. insurers and introduce our
main variables of interest that we use to test the stated hypotheses.
3 Data and variables
This section describes the construction of our sample of insurance firms which is retrieved from the
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat databases. Afterwards, we discuss
the data taken from Google Trends that we use to construct our measures of investor attention and
sentiment.
3.1 Sample construction
We build our initial sample from insurer stocks available in the CRSP database. Specifically, we
restrain our sample to those insurers with available stock price data in the time period from the
beginning of 2006 to the end of 2010. By doing so, we ensure that our sample includes enough
observations for the periods before, during, and after the crisis (i.e., we employ the crisis as a
natural experiment).
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We employ all companies with SIC codes 6311, 6321, 6331 or 6411 from the dead and active
lists in CRSP.Afterwards, we screen our resulting list of names of insurance companies for words
suggesting a non-insurance nature of the companies’ business. For our purposes, it is necessary to
have suﬃcient data on weekly quotes and thus, we restrict our sample by requiring a firm to have
at least 100 weeks of data starting from the first week in 2006 to the end of 2010 to remain in our
sample.3 Applying these filters leaves us with a final sample of 105 publicly listed U.S. insurance
companies. For each firm, we retrieve its unique ticker symbol from CRSP but also do individual
research on the ticker of a firm when it is not shown in CRSP.
The identification of life and non-life insurers and financial holding companies via SIC codes
is not unique. We thus compare SIC codes with respective NAICS codes and manually screen the
company names and look up information on the firm’s website in order to categorize our sample
firms. Whenever the SIC code classification matches the NAICS code (e.g., SIC code 6311 matches
the NAICS code 524113 for life insurers), we identify the firm according to the SIC code. When
the NAICS code does not match the SIC code, we do additional research on the insurance firm to
ensure a better classification. Eventually, we manually distinguish between life insurers (16 firms),
non-life insurers (41 firms), reinsurers (7 firms), and financial groups (41 firms).4
The names, ticker symbols, and the chosen classification of all insurance companies in our
sample are listed in Appendix II.
3.2 Dependent variables
Our two dependent variables of interest are an insurer’s weekly stock return and volatility. Stock
returns are defined as percental changes in stock prices. To model stock return volatility, we employ
a GJR-GARCH model based on weekly returns (see Glosten et al., 1993).5 Estimation is based on
3 It is important to have a suﬃcient number of data points for regression estimates and also to eﬃciently estimate
volatility using GJR-GARCH models and related specifications. Further, approximately two years of data gives a
reasonable insight on the dynamics of insurers stocks and investor sentiment.
4 For example, sometimes the NAICS codes 524298 (all other insurance) and 524210 (brokers agents) are assigned
to financial groups.
5 As noted Glosten et al. (1993), the GJR-GARCH approach is particularly well suited for stock market data as it
allows for asymmetric eﬀects of up- and downward stock movements on volatility.
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all available stock return data and is performed firm by firm. In Figure 1, we plot the time evolution
of the 20%- and 80%-quantiles and mean values of stock returns and volatility from 2006 to the
end of 2010.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
The upper panel provides evidence of non-stationarity in our time-series as ranges of stock returns
diﬀer substantially over time. The minimum of the 20%-quantile is about -4% and the maximum
of the 80%-quantile is about +5% in the time from 2006 to mid-2007. This range of weekly stock
returns is extended up until mid-2008, after which it is widened to a window of -15% to +15% in
the middle of the crisis period. Mean values of returns range from -10% to +10% but are mainly
within the window of -5% to 5% over the full sample period.
The lower panel shows that volatility was relatively flat from 2006 to the end of 2007. Occa-
sional peaks can be found in the beginning of 2008. Large spikes are present in the fourth quarter
of 2008, the peak of the crisis, where even the 20%-quantiles are higher than the 80%-quantiles of
volatility of the years before. A second peak can be observed in the first quarter of 2009. Mean
values in our sample are generally close to the 80%-quantiles, which hints at the presence of few
outliers among the insurance firms that have extremely volatile asset prices.
3.3 Google Trends
In this study, we measure investor attention and sentiment by employing internet search volume
data obtained from Google Trends, a service provided by Google Inc. for its users.6 When typing
single words or phrases into Google Trends, its user is given a graph that indicates the number of
searches that occured in a specified time period, relative to the total amount of all searches.7 Google
users are then able to export the so called Search Volume Index (SVI) at a weekly frequency, in
case the search volume is suﬃciently high over the given time period in a given geographic area
6 Access to this tool is given at www.google.com/trends.
7 The values of the relative search volumes are then scaled to a range of 0 to 100.
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(in our case the United States). As Google’s search engine is the most frequently used in the U.S.,
the SVI gives a proper estimate of the time-varying interest of U.S. households on specific topics.8
In our study, we restrict all queries on Google Trends to the United States in the time period
from January 2005 to December 2010, if not stated otherwise.9 We now describe the construction
of several attention and sentiment indicators from the literature that are used to test our hypotheses.
3.4 Household sentiment - FEARS
As our first measure build from Google Trends data, we calculate the Financial and Economic
Attitudes Revealed by Search (FEARS) index proposed by Da et al. (2015). The authors combine
the search volume from Google Trends on thirty economics-related phrases taken from the Harvard
dictionary that reveal to have a strong negative relation to market returns. Most of the words are not
necessarily related to financial crises or investing but rather reflect households’ current emotional
status or expectations of the economy. For our purposes, the FEARS-index is a way of measuring
negative (household) sentiment that proxies the general perceivement of the economy by a large
part of the population. To calculate the FEARS-index, we first take the log changes of the search
volume levels.10 The time-series of log-changes is then winsorized at the 5% level and adjusted
for seasonality by regressing on month dummies. Afterwards, we divide each of the thirty time-
series by its standard deviation to account for heteroskedasticity. Eventually, we combine the thirty
time-series by averaging.
The phrases used to construct the index were chosen to be negatively related to market re-
turns. Thus, we predict that higher values of FEARS, a higher level of negative sentiment among
households, is associated with a decrease in insurers’ stock prices in our sample as well. The cor-
8 Other advantages of using internet search volume data are that it reflects active information retrieval, is anony-
mous, and easy accessability of information on public interests (see Da et al., 2011; Irresberger et al., 2015;
Irresberger and Weiß, 2015). In this respect, using internet search volume data to measure investor attention and
sentiment beats other approaches such as implicit market sentiment measures derived, e.g., from textual analysis
(see, e.g., Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008) or surveying.
9 We start our time period in 2005 in order to use data from the first year to calculate correlations of SVIs on the
basis of a rolling window of 52 weeks of data later on.
10 We add one to each of the time-series values so that the natural logarithm is well defined for every point in time.
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relation of insurers’ stock return volatility and FEARS, however, is not obvious. On the one hand,
a higher level of negative sentiment could indicate that irrationality is driving the decision making
of households and possibly investors and thus, prices may fluctuate from fundamental values and
make market prices less predictable. On the other hand, negative sentiment could reflect the ac-
tual economic environment and does not necessarily make prices less predictable, as there simply
might be a downward trend in markets. We therefore have no expectation regarding the sign of the
coeﬃcients of FEARS in our analyses.
3.5 Retail investor attention
Next, we construct a measure that proxies for the attention of retail investors on an individual
company by employing abnormal search volume on a firm’s ticker symbol. We follow Da et al.
(2011) and employ the abnormal search volume on an insurer’s ticker symbol in Google Trends,
which is given by
ASVIi,t = log
[SVIi,t] − log [median (SVIi,t−1, . . . , SVIi,t−8)] ,
where SVIi,t is the search volume retrieved from Google Trends of ticker i in week t.11 In their
study, Da et al. (2011) show that abnormal attention on a single stock predicts higher stock prices
in the subsequent two weeks and price reversals after a certain time period. Also, in their paper
they argue that ASVI captures the attention of retail investors and thus, higher values of ASVI
represent an increased activity of this subset of market participants.12 As in Da et al. (2011), we
expect a positive eﬀect of abnormal retail investor attention and stock returns in the short run,
with price reversals afterwards. Further, we test whether a higher activity of retail investors, a
potential source of noise trading, leads to increases in asset volatility as proposed in theory (see
11 Again, we add one to each value of SVI in order to ensure that the logarithm is well-defined.
12 Da et al. (2011) argue that their measure is very likely to represent the attention of retail investor attention (they
also provide empirical evidence for this) and thus, we view this measure as a valid proxy for the presence of such
a sub-group of investors. Available data on ownership structures in 2010 from Compustat suggest that on average
75% of insurers’ shares are owned by institutional investors, leaving a large portion to non-institutional traders
that are more likely to engage in noise trading.
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De Long et al., 1990).
Although this rather new approach comes with a lot of flexibility and a possibility to directly
measure attention on single firms, it also comes with some disadvantages. Some of the insurers’
ticker symbols are very generic expressions such as “ALL” or have a double meaning, e.g. “CIA”.
Also, for ticker symbols like “Y”, the time evolution of its SVI in Google Trends is very unusual
for interest on a firm’s stock. Another shortcoming is that for some ticker symbols there simply
is not suﬃcient search volume to retrieve enough or any data at all. Therefore, we manually
screen the list of ticker symbols to identify those with ambiguous meaning in the spirit of Da et al.
(2011). For increased transparency, we indicate which companies were removed from the sample
when we include variables that use the search volume on a firm’s ticker symbol due to lack of data
availability or due to ambiguity. In total, we only have data on the search volume of ticker symbols
for a total of 54 insurers.
3.6 Crisis Sentiment Index
While the former two variables proxy for individual retail investor attention and general household
sentiment, we also want to account for investor attention and sentiment that is specifically geared
towards the U.S. financial crisis and test its impact on returns and volatility of insurer stocks.
Having a specific crisis sentiment as explanatory variable is particularly interesting due to the
uniqueness of the financial crisis. Because of this, investors were left with high uncertainty about
the economic outcome of the crisis, especially for relatively uninvoled sectors such as parts of the
insurance sector. For this reason, it is very likely that aggregate uncertainty about this special time
of turmoil may have increased volatility in asset prices.
In this study, we employ the General Crisis Sentiment Index (General CSI), which is build from
the search volume of four variations of the term “financial crisis”. We follow Irresberger et al.
(2015) and download the weekly SVI for the phrases “financial crisis”, “credit crisis”, “bank cri-
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sis”, and “subprime crisis”, which account for the evolution of the naming of the crisis over time.13
The calculation then proceeds as follows: We first employ the 52 weekly GSVI values of the four
crisis-related search terms in the year 2005 and estimate the first principal component of the four
time series (see Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Irresberger et al., 2015). The resulting values of the first
principal component are then used to proxy for the search volume of crisis-related search terms
during the year 2005. To estimate the values of SVI of crisis-related terms in each remaining week
in our sample, we use rolling windows that are enlarged by one week after each estimation (i.e., the
principal component analysis used to compute the first principal component in week t is performed
on data for weeks one through week t).14 Then, let Zt be the resulting value of the first principal
component of the SVI of the four search terms at time t, scaled to the range of 0 to 100.15 We then
consider the estimate of Zt to be our primary proxy for the general crisis sentiment. We follow
Irresberger et al. (2015) and define Zt as the General CSI.16
Whereas our proxy for the general crisis sentiment as constructed above is supposed to capture
the overall angst of investors towards the financial crisis, we additionally introduce a measure of
the relation between individual insurers and the financial crisis as perceived by investors. We es-
timate time-varying correlations ̺it between the general crisis sentiment Zt and the search volume
index SVIi,t of insurer i. To avoid a possible look-ahead bias in the estimation of the correlations,
we estimate ̺it using rolling windows of length 52 weeks using data up to week t (the rolling win-
dows are skipped ahead one week for each estimation). Finally, we construct the Crisis Sentiment
13 Additional variations of the search terms, e.g. “the banking crisis”, are highly correlated to at least one of the
existing four phrases and are therefore dropped from consideration.
14 Obviously, the principal component analysis could have also been performed on our complete data set. The
estimation procedure described above, however, guarantees that the time series of the first principal component
of crisis-related search terms does not suﬀer from a look-ahead bias.
15 The scaling is done as in the Google Trends tool through dividing by the maximum value of the series and then
multiplying by 100.
16 We decide to employ the levels of search volumes rather than changes. Taking changes (e.g., when constructing
the FEARS index) is reasonable when the search volumes are not comparable in size as it is the case, e.g., for
“gold” and “gold prices” and one wants to consolidate several time-series. For example, taking the average of the
search volumes of the two phrases just mentioned does not yield a reasonable estimate of the combined search
volume (“50” can mean totally diﬀerent magnitudes of the search volume for “gold” than for “gold prices”) when
the series are retrieved separately. By taking log-changes, the volumes become comparable but we lose the easy
interpretation. However, for the phrases related to “financial crisis”, the search volumes are comparable in their
size (which can be seen when they are typed into Google Trends simultaneously).
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Index (CSI) by combining the dynamic correlation between the first principal component Zt and a
firm’s SVIi,t, multiplying the estimated correlation with the sum (SVI i,t + Zt) and then dividing the
resulting term by 200 (see Irresberger et al., 2015):
CSIi,t :=
(
SVIi,t + Zt
200
)
· ̺it. (1)
This specific construction of the CSI accounts for several issues. First, by employing the time-
varying correlations of the first principal component and the normalized search volume index of
the firms, we capture the time variation in the crisis-related attention retail investors (together with
the general public) paid to the insurance firms in our sample. This correlation, however, does
not provide us with any information on the actual level of the search volumes in a given week. As
such, it could be that both the insurer’s SVI and the crisis-related search terms are highly correlated
simply because both their search volume indices were zero. We correct this issue in equation (1)
by multiplying the dynamic correlation with the sum of the indices and the scaling factor of 1200
(each of the two SVIs has a range of 0 to 100). When market-wide crisis sentiment is high at a
given time and a single insurer is associated with such sentiment, we expect the respective stock
price to decrease. Volatility of stock prices is assumed to increase with aggregate uncertainty on
an individual level as well and thus, CSI is expected to enter regressions employing volatility as a
dependent variable with a positive sign of the coeﬃcient.
In Figure 2, we show plots of the time-evolution of mean values of CSI and ASVI as well as
quantiles for the full sample. Also, we compare the SVI for the four crisis-related search terms
with its combined values.
Insert Figure 2 about here.
The upper panel reveals that the average values of CSI have peaks at the end of 2007 and at the
end of 2008, but generally remain flat around a mean value of zero. Even extreme values such as
the 20%-quantile do not fall below a value of -20% and the highest value is only at around 22%
for the 80%-quantile. Interestingly, the mean CSI is negative in mid-2009, where the peak of the
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crisis had already passed by and insurer stocks did not suﬀer from crisis sentiment to a large extent
anymore.
The second panel shows that the mean values of the abnormal search volume measure ASVI
often exceed the 20%- and 80%-quantiles indicating extreme diﬀerences in the dynamics of the
attention measure across our sample. The results suggest that some of the insurance firms experi-
enced more rapid changes in retail investor attention than others. However, we also observe that
most of the values range from -0.2 to 0.2. An interesting insight from this figure is that individual
attention on a stock is strongly time-varying and times of higher attention are often followed by
periods with lower abnormal attention.
Not surprisingly, the market-wide crisis sentiment shown in the lower panel increased in sum-
mer 2007 and rose steeply around the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008. Nevertheless, search
volume indices also varied significantly before and after the collapse of Lehman. Second, diﬀer-
ences between the SVI of the individual search terms can be quite high as evidenced, e.g., by the
high search volumes for “subprime crisis” in late 2007 and early 2008 thus underlining the need to
consolidate the search volume data via principal component analysis.
3.7 Other explanatory variables
In addition to our proxies for market-wide and individual sentiment or attention, we include
commonly used firm-specific variables for which we control for in our regression analyses. First,
we employ an insurer stock’s (absolute) bid-ask-spread, which is the diﬀerence of end-of-week
ask-quotes and bid-quotes. When the spread is high, an equity is considered to be less liquid. Sec-
ond, we proxy for an insurer’s size by using the market capitalization calculated by multiplying
share price and number of shares outstanding. Next, we build two variables by combining eq-
uity market data with book values of assets and book values of equity taken from the Compustat
database.17 We define the (quasi-market) leverage as one plus the ratio of book value of assets mi-
17 Due to data unavailability in Compustat, however, the number of observations for these variables is significantly
lower than for market data.
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nus book value of equity over the weekly market value of equity (see Acharya et al., 2010). Also,
we employ an insurer’s market-to-book ratio defined as the market value of equity divided by book
value of common equity.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Descriptive statistics
We now present descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables used in our
empirical study. Table I shows summary statistics for the full sample of U.S. insurers as well as
summary statistics for the sub-samples of life insurers, non-life insurers, groups and reinsurers.
Insert Table I about here.
Not surprisingly, financial groups’ stocks have the highest average prices. However, although the
group sub-sample contains the firm with the maximum market capitalization of around $186,800
million, the 75%-quantiles are higher for reinsurers ($6,151 million) and especially for life insurers
($9,970 million). Also, the spread between the smallest and the largest quartile of market capital-
ization is highest for the sample of life insurers, which seems to include a more heterogenous set
of firms. On average, life insurers had a much higher market-to-book ratio of around 19, compared
to the other samples which are in the range of 5 to 9.18 Looking at the average weekly volatility,
we do not observe stark diﬀerences across our diﬀerent sub-samples.
The average of weekly stock returns is around zero for the full sample period. In gen-
eral, life insurance firms have much higher leverage ratios than, e.g., P&C insurers (see also
Cummins and Weiss, 2014). Comparing the average quasi-market leverage of life insurers with
the other sub-samples confirms this notion, but mean values of leverage for non-life insurers are
equally high. However, this is most likely due to a few outliers driving this number, since looking
at the median values or the 75%-quantile reveals much lower leverage ratios than for life insurers.
18 Note that the number of observations for market-to-book ratios and leverage ratios are significantly lower than for
other variables that are purely based on equity market data due to lack of availability in the Compustat database.
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Instead of focusing on the summary statistics for the CSI of each sub-sample, we plot the
evolution of the 20%- and 80%-quantiles across firms as well as mean values over time to get a
better picture of its dynamics across diﬀerent insurer business lines. Figure 3 provides an overview
of the CSI values from 2006 to end-2010 for the four sub-samples.
Insert Figure 3 about here.
The time evolution of the CSI for financial groups is very similar to the values for the full-sample
with peaks around the same time periods during the crisis. However, mean values before the crisis
are significantly higher than for the full sample and are slightly positive instead of being close
to zero. The CSI for reinsurers appears to be opposite of the CSI of the other groups, as it is
significantly lower and negative in the time before the crisis years. It is highest in the end of 2007
and has a downward trend until the end of 2009, where it is, again, negative and thus, individual
reinsurance firms were associated with low crisis sentiment levels, rather than following along.19
Looking at the CSI for life insurance firms, we observe that the overall range of values is con-
sistently wider than for groups and reinsurers, with values from almost -20% to 20%. Association
with crisis sentiment is very low in the end of 2009, while it was extremely high during the peak of
the crisis. Compared to the mean of the full sample CSI, it is more volatile over the whole time pe-
riod. The average CSI for the non-life insurers is relatively flat before the crisis years, but is highly
negative in the aftermath of the crisis. Overall, the CSI for the non-life sample has the widest
range of its smaller and larger quantile indicating heterogeneity across the firms in this sub-sample
regarding crisis sentiment.
4.2 Panel regressions
We now perform several multivariate regressions to analyze the eﬀect of (market-wide) crisis
sentiment on insurer stocks. We test whether insurer stocks in the U.S. suﬀered from retail in-
vestors’ association of the insurance sector with the banking crisis and whether crisis sentiment
19 Note that this sub-sample only includes seven reinsurance firms and thus, mean values and respective quantiles
are very close together.
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aﬀected some business lines more than others. In doing so, we account for the actual exposure of
insurers to distressed parts of the financial sector due to the crisis. The sample period ranges from
2006 to end-2010 leaving us with up to 261 weekly observations for each insurance company.
As a first step, we run panel regressions of weekly stock returns and volatility on contem-
poraneous values of our measures of retail investors’ attention and crisis sentiment constructed
from internet search volume data on relevant phrases. We estimate OLS panel regressions with
firm-fixed eﬀects of the following form:
VOLATILITYi,t or RETURNSi,t = µi + β × GOOGLEi,t + εi,t, (2)
where µi are firm-fixed eﬀects and GOOGLEi,t is one of the four variables based on search volume
data, namely CSI, General CSI, ASVI or FEARS. Standard errors are corrected for clustering on the
firm level. The specification above is meant to capture most basic cross-sectional and time-serial
correlations of our dependent variables and the main independent variables of interest. Results for
the full sample and for the sub-samples Groups, Life, and Non-life are presented in Table II.
Insert Table II about here.
First of all, we notice that the CSI, the association of individual insurer stock with crisis sentiment
is insignificant in almost all of the regressions. We find no clear pattern in the correlation of CSI
and a stock’ volatility. Similar to these results, we find little evidence that retail investor attention is
correlated with insurer stock volatility. Only for the non-life insurer do we find that including only
ASVI in column (1) as explanatory variable yields a negative correlation that is significant at the
5% level. This is contrary to predictions from the theoretical work on the impact of retail investors
on the predictability of prices (se De Long et al., 1990). In this scenario, a higher abnormal search
volume and thus, retail investor attention (see Da et al., 2011), reduces volatility and makes prices
more predictable. However, two observations are noteworthy. First, we have a signifantly lower
number of observations for the search volume on ticker symbols, which leaves us with only about
half of the insurers from our full sample. Second, the model fit is extremely poor, since we have
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an adjusted R2 of about zero.
The regressions of weekly insurer stock returns on CSI and ASVI lead to a similar conclusion:
the two indicators of attention and sentiment are only a weak indicator of movements in stock
prices in this specification. Although a higher association of individual stocks with the crisis is
negatively related with returns, this holds only at the 10% significance level for the full sample.
CSI is insignificant in the regressions using the sub-samples of life insurers and groups, but the
10% significance level can be found for the non-life insurer sample. Looking at this correlation,
we suspect that non-life insurers are more aﬀected by crisis-related sentiment from 2006 to 2010
than life insurers or financial groups.
Turning to the two market-wide sentiment measures, General CSI and FEARS, we observe that
the former is strongly positively related to stock return volatility in all sub-samples. However,
the magnitude of the eﬀect varies across the samples. For all but the life insurer sample, a one
standard deviation increase of the General CSI (+12.36) is associated with an increase in volatility
of 0.3708 % (12.36 × 0.0003) in one week. This increase is only 0.2472 % ((12.36 × 0.0002) for
the life insurer sample and thus, market-wide sentiment has a 1.5 times larger eﬀect on the stock
volatility of the non-life sample. A very similar situation can be found in the regression of stock
returns on the General CSI, where life insurers are less aﬀected by the negative influence of the
market-wide crisis sentiment than other insurers. These correlations support the notion that our
measures of sentiment may have influenced equity prices of those insurers that were actually less
exposed to the adverse eﬀects of the banking crisis but still suﬀered losses on their stocks (e.g.,
non-life insurers).
Similar to the General CSI, we find that FEARS as a proxy of household-level negative senti-
ment (not necessarily tied to this specific crisis) is strongly negatively correlated to weekly stock
returns, which is in line with previous findings (see Da et al., 2015; Irresberger et al., 2015). In-
terestingly, FEARS is negatively correlated with insurers’ stock return volatility. Only for the life
insurer sample, we are left with a statistically insignificant coeﬃcient estimate. It thus seems as
if higher negative household sentiment could reflect actual economic downturns instead of time
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periods of uncertainty leading to gradual downturns and low volatility in asset prices.
Our first correlation analysis reveals that higher levels of market-wide sentiment have a stronger
influence on movements in insurer stock prices than idiosyncratic measures of attention and crisis
sentiment. In slight contrast, Da et al. (2011) find that a higher level of individual attention and
thus, a higher proportion of active retail investors, increases stock prices in the short-term and
revert to their original level in the longer term. In further analyses, we investigate the predictive
power of our measures by employing lags of their values as independent variables. Since we find
that the magnitude of the eﬀects of sentiment on stock prices and volatility diﬀers across sub-
groups of insurance companies with diﬀerent exposure to the financial crisis, we perform most of
our analyses for each of the sub-samples separately.
4.3 Vector autoregressive analyses
We extend our analysis by using volatility and retail investor attention to test the hypothesis that
noise traders make stock prices less predictable. Further, we investigate whether attention and sen-
timent for individual insurer stocks are self-fulfilling (e.g., highly volatile stocks may also attract
more attention of investors). To capture the lead-lag dynamics of insurers’ stock return volatility
and the idiosyncratic attention measures ASVI and CSI, we perform vector autoregressions (VARs).
We follow Hilscher et al. (2015) and estimate pooled VARs using OLS regressions with firm-fixed
eﬀects and up to four lags of volatility and ASVI. The regressions are of the following type:
VOLATILITYi,t = α1 +
4∑
k=1
βk × GOOGLEi,t−k +
4∑
k=1
γk × VOLATILITYi,t−k + εi,t (3)
GOOGLEi,t = α2 +
4∑
k=1
δk × GOOGLEi,t−k +
4∑
k=1
ηk × VOLATILITYi,t−k + ǫi,t, (4)
where GOOGLEi,t is either ASVIi,t or CSIi,t. Table III shows the results for the VAR analysis
for volatility and ASVI (Panel A) and volatility and CSI (Panel B) for the full sample and for the
sub-samples of diﬀerent insurer types.
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Insert Table III about here.
From Panel A we see that lagged values of ASVI are statistically highly significant determinants
of volatility for the full sample. The one-week-lag is strongly positively related to stock return
volatility. The second lag of ASVI, however, is strongly negatively correlated with volatility of the
current week with coeﬃcients of the same magnitude as for the first lag. From this we find that an
increase in uncertainty in the next week, due to an increase in retail investor attention, is reversed
in the week after that. In turn, when we take ASVI as the dependent variable in equation (4), we
find no significant influence of the lags of volatility on retail investor attention. Building on these
results, we conclude that the presence of abnormal retail investor attention on single insurer stocks
increases uncertainty about stock price movements for the full sample of 105 insurers, while there
is no reversed eﬀect of volatility on individual attention. The same holds true for the sub-sample
of financial groups, with even larger coeﬃcients.
Before, we saw that there might be diﬀerent magnitudes of the eﬀect of sentiment and attention
on volatility and returns across diﬀerent sub-samples of insurance firms. For life insurers, non-life
insurers, and reinsurers, we find no statistically significant relation between ASVI and volatility in
either direction, confirming the insignificant correlations from Table II.
From Panel B, where we replace the attention measure with the CSI, we infere similar conclu-
sions. For financial groups, we observe that a higher individual association of the equity with the
crisis leads to higher volatility in the next week and reverts in week two. However, diﬀerent from
the VARs with ASVI, we cannot infere a causal relation since higher volatility in one week leads
to less attention in the next week and reverts in week two. Thus, we can only assume a strong
correlation of individual crisis sentiment and an insurer’s stock return volatility for insurer group
companies. We conclude that the idiosyncratic measures of retail investor attention and associa-
tion with crisis sentiment of insurer stocks are strongly related to stock return volatility for insurer
groups, which are, e.g., larger in size than single-line insurers, but less so for the other sub-samples
of insurance companies.
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4.4 Does market-wide sentiment influence the cross-section of stock return
volatility?
To compare the predictive power of our market-level sentiment measures on stock returns and
volatility for the diﬀerent insurer sub-samples, we perform additional regressions including lags
of up to three weeks. Table IV shows results from OLS panel regression with firm-fixed eﬀects of
volatility (Panel A) and weekly stock returns (Panel B) on lags of the General CSI and FEARS.
Insert Table IV about here.
Overall, we find higher crisis sentiment from the previous weeks to significantly increase volatility
levels, regardless of the insurer type. However, the sample of non-life insurers stands out with
highly significant coeﬃcient estimates in all lags. Further, the size of the coeﬃcients for the two-
week and three-week lag is the largest among all groups. This underlines the diﬀerential eﬀect
of crisis sentiment on non-life insurance companies’ stocks, which suﬀered from rather irrational
sentiment, although their exposure was significantly lower compared to, e.g., financial groups or
life insurers.
Next, we include FEARS and three of its lags as explanatory variables. Values of FEARS in
the same week are negatively correlated with volatility. The values in the previous three weeks,
however, are only relevant in explaining stock return volatility of the non-life sample. Higher
negative sentiment predicts lower volatility in the next few weeks, as there is a general downward
trend in prices, indicated by its clear negative correlation with (future) stock returns.
For stock returns as dependent variable, we find an intuitive negative relation with General CSI
at first, which is reversed after two to three weeks, similar to the impact of investor attention on
stock prices. However, this is not the case for all sub-samples. FEARS, on the other hand, is a clear
predictor of negative returns in the future weeks.
Again, we see that the influence of crisis sentiment is of diﬀerent magnitude and significance
for diﬀerent insurer types. Non-life insurers, who are supposed to have only little exposure to the
critical parts of the financial crisis, e.g., mortgage markets or derivative trading, experience the
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largest eﬀects of sentiment on asset prices. This supports the hypothesis that the sentiment mea-
sures are only a weak determinant of stock price movements of other insurers, since the negative
information is already priced in due to declining fundamental values, opposed to investors simply
exiting the stocks out of irrational speculation.
Our findings suggest that crisis sentiment increases uncertainty about insurers’ stock prices and
predicts downward movements in the short-term. We also observe that this eﬀect is diﬀerent across
certain types of insurers with diﬀering fundamental values of their business operations. To further
address this issue, we run panel regressions in the spirit of Baker and Wurgler (2006), who test
whether waves of market-wide sentiment aﬀect the cross-section of stock returns. We extend this
analysis to the insurance sector and test whether crisis sentiment had an influence on the cross-
section of insurers’ stock price movements. In order to test this, we interact the General CSI with
idiosyncratic variables and run regressions of the following type:
VOLATILITYi,t = µi + β · CRISIS SENTIMENTi,t + γ · Xi,t
+δ · (CRISIS SENTIMENTi,t × Xi,t) + εi,t,
where Xi,t includes firm-specific characteristics such as bid-ask-spreads, size, leverage and market-
to-book ratio. The rationale behind this is that stocks with higher limits to arbitrage are also more
diﬃcult to price and thus, sentiment may have a diﬀerential eﬀect on the cross-section of insurer
stocks (see Baker and Wurgler, 2006). The coeﬃcient δ is of special interest to us since its esti-
mate indicates whether sentiment has cross-sectional eﬀects (when it is statistically significantly
diﬀerent from zero) or simply raises the overall level of volatility. As before, we estimate the
regressions for the full sample but also for three diﬀerent sub-samples of insurance companies.
Results are shown in Table V.
Insert Table V about here.
The main eﬀects of General CSI are strongly positively correlated with insurers’ stock return
volatility. It is significant at the 1% level for the full sample and the sub-sample of financial
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groups. However, there is a diﬀerent magnitude of this influence for the sample of life insurers
versus non-life insurers. The coeﬃcients for non-life insurers are the largest of all, again, suggest-
ing a higher impact of crisis sentiment on insurers with only little exposure to the overall crisis.
Not only are the estimated coeﬃcients of General CSI smaller than for other sub-samples, they
also are less statistically significant, a circumstance we observed before.
Except for the life sample, we find that prices of illiquid stocks in the absence of crisis sentiment
are less predictable, since the coeﬃcient of the insurers’ bid-ask-spreads is positive and highly
significant. The interaction term of the crisis sentiment and illiquidity variables is statistically
significant and enters the regressions with a negative sign of the coeﬃcient. When crisis sentiment
is high, the most illiquid insurer stocks seem to be less volatile. Larger stocks tend to be less
volatile. This correlation is intensified in the presence of high levels of crisis sentiment. However,
this relation is only significant for the full sample.
An insurer’s leverage ratio is mostly positively correlated with volatility. Although the co-
eﬃcient of the leverage interaction term is not significant in the full sample setting, we find a
significant negative coeﬃcient for all sub-sample regressions. In times of crisis sentiment, where
uncertainty about prices is on a high level, highly levered insurers stock prices are more predictable.
Including an insurer’s market-to-book ratio as explanatory variables yields mixed results. Neither
the main eﬀect nor the interaction is significant in regressions using the full sample. For financial
groups, however, we find that the coeﬃcient of the interaction term of market-to-book ratio and
crisis sentiment is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level. Stocks of financial groups
that have higher market valuations are less likely to be volatile in times of higher crisis sentiment.
On the other side, we find the exact opposite results for life insurers, although this eﬀect is about
four times less strong than for the group companies.
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5 Robustness
We now briefly report on several robustness tests that we perform to ensure the validity of our
conclusions. First of all, we re-run our panel regressions with time dummies that indicate the re-
spective month to account for unobserved heterogeneity over time (such as seasonality eﬀects).
Second, we repeat the regressions on lags of general crisis sentiment (Table IV) and the interaction
terms (Table V) with a weekly time trend.20 Also, we run regressions with bootstrapped standard
errors to mitigate an otherwise potential bias that may arise from heteroskedasticity in our gen-
erated sentiment variables. However, our overall results are quantitatively and qualitatively very
similar. As an additional robustness check, we treat zeros in the search volume data as missing
when constructing the Google variables (as a zero indicates that there is close to zero search vol-
ume and thus, there might be no data points) and repeat the main regressions without substantial
changes to our main results.
Next, we want to compare the eﬀect of crisis sentiment on insurer stock volatility with bank
stocks and stocks of industrial firms. Irresberger et al. (2015) find that banks are less aﬀected by the
General CSI than non-financial firms as they are more likely to receive implicit bailout guarantees
and are generally considered “safe” by investors. To see in how far our results for insurers match
these results, we run additional (pooled) vector autoregressions of volatility, ASVI, and CSI (as
in Table III) and panel regressions of volatility on lags of the General CSI (as in Table IV) for
samples of banks and firms from the industrial sector.21 The vector autoregressive analysis shows
that neither retail investor attention nor volatility are significant when explaining the other one in
the bank sample. For stocks of industrial firms we find an increase in volatility followed by a
reversal the week after when retail investor attention increases, but not the other way around. For
both samples, we observe that higher association with the crisis results in higher volatility the next
20 In another robustness test, we also include the VIX as a proxy for time-varying risk-aversion in our main regres-
sions along with the (general) CSI. The two indices are positively correlated but the inclusion of the VIX does
not alter our main conclusions regarding the impact of sentiment on insurer volatility
21 The samples consist of the 100 largest firms in the respective sector measured by average market capitalization
over our sample period (SIC codes 6000-6300 without 6211 and 6282 for banks and 2000-3999 for manufactur-
ing/industrials). We require firms to have at least 100 data points in 2006-2010.
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week, an eﬀect that reverts in the second week. Results from the other set of regressions using the
industrial sample are similar to those for insurers, although coeﬃcients for both General CSI and
FEARS are much smaller and thus, we observe a weaker eﬀect. The eﬀect of crisis sentiment is
largest for the insurance sector, which obviously did not receive implicit guarantees like banks, but
still suﬀered from being associated with the banking crisis as they are part of the financial sector.
As an additional analysis, we look at the sensitivity of individual insurer stock returns to the
stock market’s returns, a CDS index (we employ the Datastream NA Bank 5YR CDS index), and
a mortgage-backed-securities index (Barclays MBS 1000). Comparing the betas from regressions
of stock returns on these indexes with average volatility does not reveal an obvious pattern (e.g.,
scatter plots). We also run panel regressions of volatility where we divide the full sample into
quartiles of the beta coeﬃcients on lags of general crisis sentiment as in Table IV. We find some
evidence that, e.g., stocks that have negative co-movements with the MBS market index are slightly
more aﬀected by crisis sentiment than insurers in the other quartiles. 22
Similar to banks, some insurers required financial support via the TARP program which might
have distorted stock price movements of these insurers. To check whether this influences our
results, we exclude these insurers from our sample and re-estimate our main regressions.23 Our
conclusions, however, remain valid.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the impact of measures of idiosyncratic and market-wide investor at-
tention and sentiment based on internet search volume data from Google on the volatility of U.S.
insurer stocks between 2006 and 2010. As our first finding, we show that higher levels of crisis
sentiment explain higher levels of volatility. Perhaps more importantly, we find investor sentiment
to have a diﬀerential eﬀect on the cross-section of insurer. The influence of crisis sentiment on
volatility is strongest for those insurers that were only marginally exposed to the downward mov-
22 Regressions in quartiles of the other betas, however, does not yield a clear pattern.
23 The three companies we exclude are AIG, Hartford Financial Services, and Lincoln National Corporation.
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ing markets during the financial crisis. Aggregate sentiment lead to unusually high, unjustifiable
uncertainty about insurer stock prices which implies that investors did not necessarily base their
decision on rational assessments of insurers’ actual exposure to the crisis. Also, comparing the in-
surance and banking sector reveals that the eﬀects of crisis sentiment were dominant in the former
part of the financial sector, although the crisis originated in the latter.
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Appendix I: Variable definitions and data sources.
The appendix presents definitions as well as data sources for all dependent and independent variables that are used in
the empirical study.
Variable name Definition Data source
Dependent variable and main explanatory variables of interest
Volatility End-of-week equity volatility based on GJR-GARCH(1,1)-model estimation of weekly
stock returns.
CRSP.
Returns End-of-week buy-and-hold returns CRSP.
General crisis sentiment First principal component of the four GSVIs of the search terms “financial crisis”, “credit
crisis”, “subprime crisis” and “bank crisis”, calculated using a rolling window enlarged
by one week after each estimation, starting with a window of 52 weeks for the first year.
For each quarter, the Crisis-GSVI is the average of the weekly first principal components
in that quarter.
Google Trends, own calc.
CSI The Crisis Sentiment Index is computed using data from Google Trends via CS Iit :=(
GS VIit+Zt
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)
· ρit. where Zt is the first principal component of the Google Search Volume In-
dices (GSVI) for several crisis-related search query terms, GS VIit is the GSVI for insurer
ith ticker symbol and ρit is the (dynamic) correlation between Zt and GS VIit .
CRSP, Google Trends,
Irresberger et al. (2015).
Control variables
ASVI log [GSVIt] − log [median(GSVIt−1, . . . ,GSVIt−8)]. GS VIit is the GSVI for insurer ith
ticker symbol.
Google Trends, Da et al.
(2011).
FEARS The FEARS index is defined as FEARS t = 130
∑30
j=1 ∆AGS VI
j
t , where ∆AGS VI
j
t is the
adjusted weekly change in search term j. The thirty economic-related search terms are
introduced in Da et al. (2015).
Google Trends, Da et al.
(2015)
Bid-Ask-Spread An equity’s bid-ask-spread calculated by the diﬀerence of end-of-week ask-quotes and
bid-quotes.
CRSP, own calc.
Size Total market capitalization calculated by multiplying share price and number of shares
outstanding.
CRSP, own calc.
Leverage Quasi-market leverage as defined in Acharya et al. (2010) as one plus the ratio of book
value of debt over market value of equity.
CRSP, Compustat.
Market-to-book-ratio Market value of common equity divided by book value of common equity. CRSP, Compustat.
Google Dummy variable that is one if an insurer is included in our sample and zero when it is
excluded due to ambiguous meaning (unusual search volume) or has no search volume
for the time period 2006 to 2010.
Google Trends.
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Appendix II: Insurance companies
The appendix presents names, ticker symbols, business type classification for insurance companies used in this study as well as an indicator for availability of the
respective data on a ticker symbol’s search volume in Google Trends.
NAME TICKER CLASSIFICATION GOOGLE DATA NAME TICKER CLASSIFICATION GOOGLE DATA
ACE LTD NEW ACE GROUP YES METLIFE INC MET LIFE YES
AFFIRMATIVE INSURANCE HOLDINGS INC AFFM GROUP NO MONTPELIER RE HOLDINGS LTD MRH GROUP NO
ALFA CORP ALFA LIFE YES N Y M A G I C INC NYM NON-LIFE NO
ALLEGHANY CORP DE Y NON-LIFE YES NATIONAL ATLANTIC HOLDINGS CORP NAHC GROUP NO
ALLIED WORLD ASSURANCE CO HOLDINGS AG AWH GROUP NO NATIONAL INTERSTATE CORP NATL NON-LIFE YES
ALLSTATE CORP ALL NON-LIFE YES EMPLOYERS HOLDINGS INC EIG GROUP NO
ALTERRA CAPITAL HOLDINGS LTD MXRE GROUP NO FLAGSTONE REINSURANCE HOLDINGS SA FSR REINSURER YES
AMCOMP INC NEW AMCP NON-LIFE NO GREENLIGHT CAPITAL RE LTD GLRE REINSURER NO
AMERICAN EQUITY INVESTMENT LIFE HOLDING CO AEL GROUP NO MAIDEN HOLDINGS LTD MHLD REINSURER NO
AMERICAN FINANCIAL GROUP INC NEW AFG GROUP YES NATIONAL SECURITY GROUP INC NSEC GROUP NO
AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE CORP AMIC GROUP NO NATIONAL WESTERN LIFE INS CO NWLI LIFE NO
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP INC AIG GROUP YES OLD REPUBLIC INTERNATIONAL CORP ORI NON-LIFE YES
AMERICAN NATIONAL INS CO ANAT LIFE NO ONEBEACON INSURANCE GROUP LTD OB GROUP YES
AMERICAN PHYSICIANS CAPITAL INC ACAP NON-LIFE NO PARTNERRE LTD PRE REINSURER YES
AMERISAFE INC AMSF NON-LIFE NO PLATINUM UNDERWRITERS HOLDINGS LTD PTP GROUP YES
ARCH CAPITAL GROUP LTD NEW ACGL GROUP NO PRIMERICA INC PRI LIFE YES
ASPEN INSURANCE HOLDINGS LTD AHL GROUP YES PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL GROUP INC PFG GROUP YES
ASSURANT INC AIZ GROUP NO PROASSURANCE CORP PRA NON-LIFE YES
ASSURED GUARANTY LTD AGO GROUP YES PROGRESSIVE CORP OH PGR NON-LIFE YES
AXIS CAPITAL HOLDINGS LTD AXS GROUP NO PROTECTIVE LIFE CORP PL LIFE YES
BERKLEY W R CORP BER NON-LIFE YES REINSURANCE GROUP OF AMERICA INC RGA REINSURER YES
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC BRK GROUP YES RENAISSANCE RE HOLDINGS LTD RNR GROUP YES
CITIZENS INC CIA LIFE YES SEABRIGHT HOLDINGS INC SBX GROUP NO
COMMERCE GROUP INC MASS CGI NON-LIFE YES STANCORP FINANCIAL GROUP INC SFG GROUP NO
DARWIN PROFESSIONAL UNDERWRITERS DR NON-LIFE YES SYMETRA FINANCIAL CORP SYA LIFE NO
DELPHI FINANCIAL GROUP INC DFG LIFE YES TORCHMARK CORP TMK LIFE NO
DIRECT GENERAL CORP DRCT NON-LIFE NO TOWER GROUP INTERNATIONAL LTD TWGP NON-LIFE NO
EASTERN INSURANCE HOLDINGS INC EIHI GROUP NO TRANSATLANTIC HOLDINGS INC TRH GROUP NO
ENDURANCE SPECIALTY HOLDINGS LTD ENH GROUP YES TRAVELERS COMPANIES INC TRV NON-LIFE YES
ENSTAR GROUP INC GA ESGR GROUP NO TRIPLE S MANAGEMENT CORP GTS NON-LIFE YES
EVEREST RE GROUP LTD RE GROUP YES UNICO AMERICAN CORP UNAM GROUP YES
FIRST ACCEPTANCE CORP FAC NON-LIFE YES UNITED FIRE GROUP INC UFCS NON-LIFE NO
FIRST MERCURY FINANCIAL CORP FMR NON-LIFE YES UNIVERSAL INSURANCE HOLDINGS INC UVE GROUP NO
GAINSCO INC GAN NON-LIFE YES UNUM GROUP UNM LIFE YES
GENWORTH FINANCIAL INC GNW LIFE YES VALIDUS HOLDINGS LTD VR GROUP YES
GLOBAL INDEMNITY PLC INDM NON-LIFE NO WHITE MOUNTAINS INS GROUP LTD WTM GROUP NO
GREAT AMERICAN FINANCIAL RES INC GFR LIFE YES CASTLEPOINT HOLDINGS LTD CPHL GROUP NO
HALLMARK FINANCIAL SERVICES INC HALL GROUP YES IMPERIAL HOLDINGS INC IFT GROUP YES
HANOVER INSURANCE GROUP INC THG NON-LIFE NO NATIONWIDE FINANCIAL SERVICES IN NFS LIFE YES
HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP INC HIG NON-LIFE YES NORTH POINTE HOLDINGS CORP NPTE GROUP NO
HORACE MANN EDUCATORS CORP NEW HMN NON-LIFE NO ODYSSEY RE HOLDINGS CORP ORH GROUP NO
INDEPENDENCE HOLDING CO NEW IHC GROUP YES PAULA FINANCIAL PFCO NON-LIFE NO
INFINITY PROPERTY & CASUALTY CORP IPCC NON-LIFE YES PENN AMERICA GROUP INC PNG NON-LIFE YES
JAMES RIVER GROUP INC JRVR NON-LIFE NO PENN TREATY AMERICAN CORP PTYA NON-LIFE NO
KANSAS CITY LIFE INS CO KCLI LIFE NO PROCENTURY CORP PROS NON-LIFE YES
KINGSWAY FINANCIAL SERVICES INC KFS NON-LIFE NO QUANTA CAPITAL HOLDINGS LTD QNTA GROUP NO
LINCOLN NATIONAL CORP LNC LIFE NO REPUBLIC COMPANIES GROUP INC RUTX NON-LIFE NO
LOEWS CORP LTR NON-LIFE YES SAFECO CORP SAF NON-LIFE YES
MAJESTIC CAPITAL LTD CRMH GROUP NO SCOTTISH RE GROUP LTD SCT REINSURER YES
MEADOWBROOK INSURANCE GROUP INC MIG NON-LIFE YES SPECIALTY UNDERWRITERS ALLIANCE INC SUAI REINSURER NO
MERCER INSURANCE GROUP INC MIGP NON-LIFE NO VESTA INSURANCE GROUP INC VTA NON-LIFE YES
MERCHANTS GROUP INC MGP NON-LIFE YES ZENITH NATIONAL INSURANCE CORP ZNT NON-LIFE NO
MERCURY GENERAL CORP NEW MCY NON-LIFE NO
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Insurer stock returns and volatility (2006-2010).
The figure shows a plot of the evolution of stock returns and volatility for a sample of 105 U.S. insurers from 2006 to
end-2010. Returns are the weekly percental changes in end-of-week stock prices. Volatility is obtained from estimating
a GJR-GARCH model for an insurer’s weekly stock returns for the full sample period. The solid line shows the mean
values across the sample. The area shaded in grey shows the range between the empirical 20%- and 80% quantiles,
which are computed separately for each point of time.
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Figure 2: Crisis Sentiment Index, Abnormal Search Volume, and General Crisis Sentiment.
The figure shows a plot of the evolution of the Crisis Sentiment Index (CSI) in the upper panel and abnormal search volume (ASVI) second
panel across the sample of 105 U.S. insurers for the sample period from 2006 to end-2010. The CSI for firm i at week t is defined as CSIi,t ≔
(SVIi,t + Zt)/200 · ̺it , where SVIi,t is the Search Volume Index (SVI) for the i-th firm’s ticker symbol, Zt is the first principle component of the SVI
for four crisis-related search terms, and i̺t is the correlation between Zt and SVIi,t . ASVI is the abnormal SVI introduced in Da et al. (2011) and
is calculated as the log-changes of SVI in week t and the median value of SVI in the previous eight weeks. The solid line shows the mean values
across the sample. The area shaded in grey shows the range between the empirical 20%- and 80% quantiles, which are computed separately for
each point of time. The lower panel shows the SVI for the four crisis-related search terms (grey lines) and its principal component Zt (black line).
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Figure 3: Time evolution of the Crisis Sentiment Index by insurer type.
The figure shows a plot of the evolution of the Crisis Sentiment Index (CSI) for sub-samples of 105 U.S. insurers for the sample period from 2006 to end-2010. The
CSI for firm i at week t is defined as CSIi,t ≔ (SVIi,t + Zt)/200 · ̺it, where SVIi,t is the Search Volume Index (SVI) for the i-th firm’s ticker symbol, Z t is the first
principle component of the SVI for four crisis-related search terms, and ̺ it is the correlation between Zt and SVIi,t. The solid line shows the mean values across the
sub-sample. The area shaded in grey shows the range between the empirical 20%- and 80% quantiles, which are computed separately for each point of time. The
sub-samples are life insurers (16 firms), non-life insurers (41 firms), financial groups (41 firms) and reinsurers (7 firms).
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Table I: Summary statistics
The table presents descriptive statistics of the 105 U.S. insurers and sub-samples for the period from 2006 to end-2010.
Additionally, descriptive statistics for the General CSI and FEARS-index from Da et al. (2015) shown. We report the
number of observations, minimum and maximum values, 1st and 3rd quartile, mean and median values. Variables
based on stock price data are winsorized at the 5% level to mitigate a potential bias from outliers. All variables and
data sources are defined in Appendix I.
Min 1st quartile Median Mean 3rd quartile Max N
FEARS -1.7866 -0.1935 0.0049 0.0040 0.2253 2.2352 261
General CSI 0.0000 1.0150 9.9550 11.0690 13.3750 100.0000 261
All (105 firms) Min 1st quartile Median Mean 3rd quartile Max N
Price (in US dollars) 0.1900 13.1200 25.3300 73.1400 48.5200 4,950.0000 24,544
Market capitalization (in million US $) 15.5500 378.1000 1,798.0000 6,030.0000 4,075.0000 186,800.0000 18,098
Returns -0.3994 -0.0236 0.0002 0.0006 0.0244 0.5214 24,529
BAS 0.0000 0.0100 0.0300 0.2687 0.0800 122.4000 24,528
Volatility 0.0000 0.0011 0.0021 0.0056 0.0046 0.5071 24,529
CSI -0.4560 -0.0490 0.0050 0.0110 0.0760 0.7140 13,604
Market-to-book ratio 0.0040 0.3830 0.9430 9.3200 1.6750 616.6810 11,167
Leverage 1.0050 2.4730 4.5580 33.1300 15.6750 834.2930 11,167
ASVI -4.5050 -0.0670 0.0000 0.0210 0.0730 4.6150 14,194
Life (16 firms) Min 1st quartile Median Mean 3rd quartile Max N
Price (in US dollars) 0.2500 11.3200 20.8600 33.0600 48.2100 158.6500 3,305
Market capitalization (in million US $) 17.6900 436.9000 1,785.0000 5,493.0000 9,970.0000 23,360.0000 2,215
Returns -0.3994 -0.0215 0.0000 -0.0005 0.0222 0.5214 3,302
BAS 0.0000 0.0100 0.0300 0.0976 0.0700 2.4300 3,299
Volatility 0.0000 0.0011 0.0020 0.0051 0.0036 0.2658 3,302
CSI -0.3913 -0.0302 0.0356 0.0325 0.1046 0.5995 2,467
Market-to-book ratio 0.0185 0.1262 0.9481 19.0565 4.3033 169.3384 1,616
Leverage 1.0250 1.9470 8.9240 42.7810 53.6480 549.6730 1,616
ASVI -3.8177 -0.0579 0.0000 0.0134 0.0658 3.9512 2,610
Groups (41 firms) Min 1st quartile Median Mean 3rd quartile Max N
Price (in US dollars) 0.3300 15.3600 27.9000 115.1500 48.8200 4,950.0000 9,814
Market capitalization (in million US $) 15.5500 431.4000 1,981.0000 7,544.0000 4,066.0000 186,800.0000 8,617
Returns -0.3155 -0.0225 0.0008 0.0009 0.0239 0.3723 9,810
BAS 0.0000 0.0200 0.0300 0.3902 0.0800 122.4000 9,808
Volatility 0.0002 0.0011 0.0019 0.0053 0.0042 0.5071 9,810
CSI -0.3280 -0.0300 0.0110 0.0270 0.0900 0.7140 4,168
Market-to-book ratio 0.0110 0.4320 0.8350 8.9730 1.2320 616.6810 6,296
Leverage 1.0210 3.0990 4.5090 23.6680 9.9370 823.3900 6,296
ASVI -4.5050 -0.0690 0.0000 0.0270 0.0670 4.6150 4,437
Reinsurers (7 firms) Min 1st quartile Median Mean 3rd quartile Max N
Price (in US dollars) 1.5000 17.9600 26.2600 55.8100 54.1200 275.0000 1,628
Market capitalization (in million US $) 50.2100 635.2000 1,831.0000 4,971.0000 6,151.0000 46,860.0000 1,016
Returns -0.1571 -0.0232 0.0004 0.0004 0.0231 0.1353 1,627
BAS 0.0100 0.0100 0.0200 0.4428 0.0575 9.6250 1,626
Volatility 0.0005 0.0010 0.0018 0.0040 0.0038 0.0461 1,627
CSI -0.2454 -0.0632 -0.0092 -0.0198 0.0273 0.1512 978
Market-to-book ratio 0.0134 0.0620 0.0898 6.3221 0.2022 160.7071 422
Leverage 1.0050 16.1220 28.6460 58.0970 92.7590 551.6410 422
ASVI -3.9512 -0.0790 0.0000 0.0165 0.0690 4.3438 1,044
Non-life (41 firms) Min 1st quartile Median Mean 3rd quartile Max N
Price (in US dollars) 0.1900 11.8900 23.7400 47.4700 47.3200 606.0200 9,797
Market capitalization (in million US $) 40.1400 331.6000 1,285.0000 4,306.0000 3,527.0000 40,130.0000 6,250
Returns -0.3781 -0.0256 0.0000 0.0007 0.0258 0.4118 9,790
BAS 0.0000 0.0100 0.0300 0.1758 0.0800 10.9600 9,795
Volatility 0.0001 0.0012 0.0025 0.0064 0.0053 0.1466 9,790
CSI -0.4560 -0.0680 -0.0010 -0.0040 0.0610 0.6310 5,991
Market-to-book ratio 0.0040 0.8710 1.4050 4.9810 2.9900 149.2310 2,833
Leverage 1.0170 1.9070 3.2150 44.9310 5.9970 834.2930 2,833
ASVI -4.3170 -0.0660 0.0000 0.0210 0.0790 4.6150 6,003
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Table II: OLS panel regressions of stock returns and volatility on attention and sentiment
indicators
The table shows the results of OLS panel regressions for (sub-)samples of U.S. insurance companies’ weekly stock returns and volatility on measures
of investor attention and sentiment. All regressions are performed with firm-fixed eﬀects and are of the following form:
VOLATILITYi,t or RETURNSi,t = µi + β × GOOGLEi,t + εi,t ,
where µi are firm-fixed eﬀects and GOOGLEi,t is one of the four variables based on search volume data, namely CSI, General CSI, ASVI or FEARS.
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the firm level. Panel A shows results using the full sample, while the other panels present estimates
from the sub-samples of Groups (Panel B), Life (Panel C), and Non-life (Panel D). Variables based on stock price data are winsorized at the 5%
level to mitigate a potential bias from outliers. All variable definitions and data sources are given in AppendixI. ***,**,* denote coeﬃcients that
are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: All (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Volatility Volatility Volatility Volatility Returns Returns Returns Returns
ASVI 0.0004 -0.0002
(0.432) (0.511)
CSI 0.0052 -0.0111∗
(0.597) (0.082)
General CSI 0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
FEARS -0.0007∗∗∗ -0.0037∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
N 12,484 12,019 24,529 24,529 12,484 12,019 24,529 24,529
Adj. R2 0.000 0.001 0.058 0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.008 0.001
Panel B: Groups (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Volatility Volatility Volatility Volatility Returns Returns Returns Returns
ASVI 0.0008 -0.0001
(0.392) (0.795)
CSI 0.0369 -0.0133
(0.207) (0.406)
General CSI 0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
FEARS -0.0006∗∗∗ -0.0039∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.003)
N 4,098 3,854 9,810 9,810 4,098 3,854 9,810 9,810
Adj. R2 0.000 0.012 0.037 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.009 0.001
Panel C: Life (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Volatility Volatility Volatility Volatility Returns Returns Returns Returns
ASVI 0.0003 -0.0037∗
(0.705) (0.068)
CSI 0.0033 -0.0002
(0.318) (0.988)
General CSI 0.0002∗∗ -0.0003∗∗
(0.040) (0.010)
FEARS -0.0006 -0.0055∗∗
(0.152) (0.027)
N 1,990 1,847 3,302 3,302 1,990 1,847 3,302 3,302
Adj. R2 -0.000 -0.000 0.038 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.006 0.002
Panel D: Non-life (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Volatility Volatility Volatility Volatility Returns Returns Returns Returns
ASVI -0.0004∗∗ 0.0001
(0.047) (0.889)
CSI -0.0086 -0.0137∗
(0.427) (0.096)
General CSI 0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
FEARS -0.0010∗∗∗ -0.0037∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.003)
N 5,470 5,458 9,790 9,790 5,470 5,458 9,790 9,790
Adj. R2 0.000 0.009 0.108 0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.007 0.001
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Table III: Vector autoregressions of stock return volatility and abnormal search volume
This table shows the results from pooled vector autoregressions as inHilscher et al. (2015) using OLS regressions with firm-fixed eﬀects and up to four lags of volatility and ASVI or CSI for the full sample
of 105 U.S. insurers and sub-samples. The regressions are of the following type:
VOLATILITYi,t = α1 +
4∑
k=1
βk × GOOGLEi,t−k +
4∑
k=1
γk × VOLATILITYi,t−k + εi,t
GOOGLEi,t = α2 +
4∑
k=1
δk × GOOGLEi,t−k +
4∑
k=1
ηk × VOLATILITYi,t−k + ǫi,t ,
where GOOGLEi,t is either ASVIi,t (Panel A) or CSIi,t (Panel B). Volatility is winsorized at the 5% level. Variable definitions and data sources are given in AppendixI. ***,**,* denote coeﬃcients that
are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: ASVI All Group Life Non-life Reinsurers
Volatility ASVI Volatility ASVI Volatility ASVI Volatility ASVI Volatility ASVI
Volatilityt−1 0.8640∗∗∗ -0.2200 0.9170∗∗∗ -0.3350 0.6470∗∗∗ 0.4000 0.9300∗∗∗ 0.4350 0.9900∗∗∗ 2.0130
(0.000) (0.620) (0.000) (0.628) (0.000) (0.475) (0.000) (0.738) (0.000) (0.809)
Volatilityt−2 -0.0462∗∗∗ -0.0426 -0.1350∗∗∗ 0.0209 0.1680∗∗∗ -0.2060 -0.0347∗ -2.1150 0.0110 -13.5400
(0.000) (0.942) (0.000) (0.982) (0.000) (0.758) (0.063) (0.233) (0.815) (0.248)
Volatilityt−3 0.0611∗∗∗ 0.5640 0.1290∗∗∗ 0.9520 -0.0650∗∗ -0.7260 0.0087 1.6840 -0.0589 4.6980
(0.000) (0.335) (0.000) (0.307) (0.017) (0.278) (0.642) (0.342) (0.211) (0.688)
Volatilityt−4 -0.0361∗∗∗ -0.355 -0.0805∗∗∗ -0.5640 0.0995∗∗∗ 0.3850 0.0108 -0.5500 0.0088 8.8120
(0.000) (0.403) (0.000) (0.387) (0.000) (0.496) (0.431) (0.673) (0.798) (0.304)
ASVIt−1 0.0008∗∗∗ 0.7410∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.7470∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.7930∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.6960∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.7750∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.988) (0.000) (0.892) (0.000) (0.685) (0.000)
ASVIt−1 -0.0009∗∗∗ -0.0001 -0.0016∗∗∗ -0.0153 0.0005 -0.1130∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.0426∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.0183
(0.000) (0.996) (0.000) (0.428) (0.641) (0.000) (0.917) (0.009) (0.990) (0.657)
ASVIt−1 0.0001 0.0195∗ 0.0004 0.0539∗∗∗ -0.0004 -0.0017 -0.0001 -0.0188 -0.0001 -0.0412
(0.632) (0.077) (0.360) (0.005) (0.747) (0.953) (0.742) (0.250) (0.705) (0.292)
ASVIt−1 0.0001 -0.2760∗∗∗ 0.0002 -0.3290∗∗∗ 0.0002 -0.0283 0.0000 -0.2120∗∗∗ 0.0000 -0.2550∗∗∗
(0.391) (0.000) (0.632) (0.000) (0.800) (0.214) (0.810) (0.000) (0.877) (0.000)
Constant 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0125∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0144 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0034 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0158∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0059
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.141) (0.000) (0.567) (0.000) (0.008) (0.003) (0.785)
N 12,268 12,279 4,030 4,033 1,950 1,954 5,378 5,381 910 911
Adj. R2 0.715 0.572 0.717 0.595 0.637 0.502 0.826 0.516 0.879 0.636
Panel B: CSI All Group Life Non-life Reinsurers
Volatility CSI Volatility CSI Volatility CSI Volatility CSI Volatility CSI
Volatilityt−1 0.8690∗∗∗ -0.0760∗∗∗ 0.9380∗∗∗ -0.1290∗∗∗ 0.6480∗∗∗ 0.1310∗∗∗ 0.9290∗∗∗ 0.0604 0.9880∗∗∗ -0.4840
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.419) (0.000) (0.160)
Volatilityt−2 -0.0419∗∗∗ 0.1020∗∗∗ -0.1230∗∗∗ 0.1310∗∗∗ 0.1690∗∗∗ -0.0146 -0.0343∗ -0.0162 0.0116 0.2910
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.780) (0.066) (0.874) (0.812) (0.548)
Volatilityt−3 0.0486∗∗∗ -0.0334 0.0857∗∗∗ -0.0065 -0.0665∗∗ -0.0998∗ 0.0087 -0.0038 -0.0622 0.0976
(0.000) (0.241) (0.000) (0.869) (0.019) (0.056) (0.635) (0.971) (0.202) (0.840)
Volatilityt−4 -0.0302∗∗∗ -0.0326 -0.0632∗∗∗ -0.0306 0.0977∗∗∗ -0.0130 0.0098 -0.1270∗ 0.0161 -0.1740
(0.001) (0.114) (0.000) (0.255) (0.000) (0.770) (0.475) (0.090) (0.653) (0.624)
CSIt−1 0.0641∗∗∗ 1.0120∗∗∗ 0.1600∗∗∗ 0.9380∗∗∗ -0.0212∗ 1.0770∗∗∗ -0.0008 1.0750∗∗∗ 0.0032 0.8780∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.097) (0.000) (0.756) (0.000) (0.359) (0.000)
CSIt−2 -0.0840∗∗∗ 0.0564∗∗∗ -0.2070∗∗∗ 0.1170∗∗∗ 0.0298 -0.0246 -0.0024 0.0166 0.0002 0.1040∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.113) (0.481) (0.509) (0.408) (0.963) (0.025)
CSIt−3 0.0041 -0.0120 0.0194 0.0091 -0.0060 -0.0530 0.0010 -0.0345∗ -0.0010 0.0441
(0.462) (0.364) (0.132) (0.701) (0.743) (0.119) (0.786) (0.086) (0.831) (0.326)
CSIt−4 0.0168∗∗∗ -0.0917∗∗∗ 0.0350∗∗∗ -0.1160∗∗∗ -0.0044 -0.0257 0.0015 -0.0868∗∗∗ -0.0009 -0.0749∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.722) (0.266) (0.545) (0.000) (0.793) (0.022)
Constant 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0008∗∗∗ 0.0010∗∗∗ 0.0018∗∗∗ 0.0010∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0005 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.175) (0.003) (0.757)
N 11,803 11,814 3,786 3,789 1,807 1,811 5,366 5,369 844 845
Adj. R2 0.721 0.946 0.741 0.915 0.636 0.960 0.826 0.960 0.881 0.907
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Table IV: OLS panel regressions of stock returns and volatility on crisis sentiment
This table shows results from OLS panel regression with firm-fixed eﬀects of volatility (Panel A) and weekly stock returns (Panel B) on (lags of) market-wide
crisis sentiment and household sentiment measures. General CSI is the principal component of four crisis-related search volume indices from Google Trends (see
Irresberger et al., 2015). FEARS is a household sentiment measure based on the search volume of thirty economics-related search terms in the United States (see
Da et al., 2015). Variables based on stock price data are winsorized at the 5% level to mitigate a potential bias from outliers. All variable definitions and data
sources are given in Appendix I. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the firm level. ***,**,* denote coeﬃcients that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Volatility All Groups Life Non-Life Reinsurer All Groups Life Non-Life Reinsurer
General CSI -0.0103 0.0137 0.0280 -0.0471∗ 0.0041
(0.658) (0.790) (0.271) (0.057) (0.950)
General CSIt−1 0.0853∗∗ 0.1300 0.0393 0.0640∗∗∗ 0.0474
(0.016) (0.139) (0.245) (0.002) (0.111)
General CSIt−2 0.0396 0.0004 0.0451 0.0780∗∗ 0.0163
(0.147) (0.995) (0.134) (0.034) (0.804)
General CSIt−3 0.2310∗∗∗ 0.1820∗∗∗ 0.1330∗∗ 0.3150∗∗∗ 0.1920∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.015) (0.000) (0.018)
FEARS -0.9440∗∗∗ -0.7060∗∗∗ -0.4150∗∗ -1.3800∗∗∗ -0.7750
(0.000) (0.005) (0.047) (0.000) (0.219)
FEARSt−1 -0.0005∗∗∗ -0.2720 0.1630 -1.0200∗∗∗ -0.5400
(0.007) (0.470) (0.702) (0.000) (0.315)
FEARSt−2 -0.0003∗∗ -0.2400 0.3690 -0.6490∗∗∗ -0.4490
(0.028) (0.366) (0.534) (0.002) (0.269)
FEARSt−3 -0.0002 -0.0667 0.4430 -0.4810∗∗∗ -0.3780
(0.173) (0.754) (0.485) (0.007) (0.273)
Constant 1.7400∗∗∗ 1.5500∗∗ 2.6300∗∗ 1.7200∗ 1.1300 5.5800∗∗∗ 5.1800∗∗∗ 5.1500∗∗∗ 6.3800∗∗∗ 4.0600∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.037) (0.027) (0.091) (0.230) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 24,259 9,699 3,263 9,688 1,609 24,259 9,699 3,263 9,688 1,609
Adj. R2 0.091 0.054 0.049 0.181 0.294 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.002
Panel B: Returns All Groups Life Non-Life Reinsurer All Groups Life Non-Life Reinsurer
General CSI -0.0007∗∗∗ -0.0007∗∗∗ -0.0006∗ -0.0008∗∗∗ -0.0004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.098) (0.000) (0.235)
General CSIt−1 -0.0002 -0.0004∗ -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0009∗∗
(0.123) (0.090) (0.647) (0.897) (0.041)
General CSIt−2 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.0002 0.0011∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.699) (0.398) (0.077)
General CSIt−3 0.0002∗∗ 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003∗ -0.0001
(0.030) (0.325) (0.352) (0.056) (0.898)
FEARS -0.0095∗∗∗ -0.0098∗∗∗ -0.0097∗∗∗ -0.0099∗∗∗ -0.0049∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.007)
FEARSt−1 -0.0104∗∗∗ -0.0106∗∗∗ -0.0103∗∗ -0.0103∗∗∗ -0.0104∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.026) (0.000) (0.005)
FEARSt−2 -0.0116∗∗∗ -0.0110∗∗∗ -0.0093∗∗∗ -0.0133∗∗∗ -0.0087∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.024)
FEARSt−3 -0.00746∗∗∗ -0.00845∗∗∗ -0.00236 -0.00828∗∗∗ -0.00640∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.256) (0.000) (0.003)
Constant 0.0038∗∗∗ 0.0042∗∗∗ 0.0023∗ 0.0039∗∗∗ 0.0035∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0012∗∗∗ -0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0010∗∗∗ 0.0007∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.076) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 24,259 9,699 3,263 9,688 1,609 24,259 9,699 3,263 9,688 1,609
Adj. R2 0.012 0.014 0.008 0.011 0.018 0.012 0.014 0.010 0.012 0.011
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Table V: OLS panel regressions of stock return volatility on crisis sentiment interaction terms
The table shows results from OLS Panel regressions of stock return volatility on market-wide crisis sentiment and interaction terms.
VOLATILITYi,t = µi + β · CRISIS SENTIMENTi,t + γ · Xi,t + δ · (CRISIS SENTIMENTi,t × Xi,t) + εi,t ,
where Xi,t includes firm-specific characteristics such as bid-ask-spreads, size, leverage and market-to-book ratio. CRISIS SENTIMENTi,t is the
General CSI (see Irresberger et al., 2015) and CRISIS SENTIMENTi,t × Xi,t is the interaction term. µi are firm-fixed eﬀects. Standard errors are
corrected for clustering at the firm level. Panel A shows results using the full sample, while the other panels present estimates from the sub-samples
of Groups (Panel B), Life (Panel C), and Non-life (Panel D). Variables based on stock price data are winsorized at the 5% level to mitigate a
potential bias from outliers. All variable definitions and data sources are given in AppendixI. All coeﬃcients are multiplied by 1000 for readability.
***,**,* denote coeﬃcients that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: All (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
General CSI 0.3000∗∗∗ 0.3000∗∗∗ 0.2000∗∗∗ 0.3000∗∗∗ 0.2000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BAS 0.1000∗∗ 75.7000∗
(0.043) (0.066)
BAS × General CSI -0.0010∗∗ -0.0051∗
(0.037) (0.057)
Size (×10−9) -0.4000∗∗∗ -0.2000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001)
Size × General CSI (×10−9) -0.0047∗ -0.0026∗
(0.057) (0.092)
Leverage 0.2000∗∗ 0.1000∗
(0.040) (0.060)
Leverage × General CSI -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.739) (0.622)
Market-to-book ratio -0.0020 -0.0004
(0.818) (0.959)
Market-to-book ratio × General CSI -1.8000 -0.8000
(0.196) (0.424)
Constant 2.5000∗∗∗ 4.7000∗∗∗ -3.4000 2.4000∗∗∗ -0.3000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.278) (0.001) (0.909)
N 24,513 18,086 11,161 11,161 11,149
Adj. R2 0.058 0.103 0.117 0.036 0.138
Panel B: Groups (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
General CSI 0.2730∗∗∗ 0.2690∗∗∗ 0.2660∗∗∗ 0.3090∗∗∗ 0.2780∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001)
BAS 0.0890∗∗ 0.0628∗∗
(0.036) (0.032)
BAS × General CSI -0.0067∗∗ -0.0045∗∗
(0.032) (0.034)
Size (×10−9) -0.3590∗∗∗ -0.1070
(0.000) (0.188)
Size × General CSI (×10−9) -0.0037 -0.0016
(0.180) (0.120)
Leverage 0.3140∗∗∗ 0.2680∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.005)
Leverage × General CSI -0.0023∗∗∗ -0.0020∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.003)
Market-to-book ratio -0.0009 0.0014
(0.824) (0.447)
Market-to-book ratio × General CSI -0.0064∗ -0.0046∗∗
(0.095) (0.028)
Constant 2.2600∗∗∗ 5.0500∗∗∗ -4.2400∗∗ 2.2500∗∗ -2.3100
(0.002) (0.000) (0.038) (0.023) (0.440)
N 9,804 8,614 6,293 6,293 6,289
Adj. R2 0.037 0.113 0.158 0.029 0.163
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Table V: OLS panel regressions of stock return volatility on crisis sentiment interaction terms
(continued)
Panel C: Life (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
General CSI 0.2100∗ 0.2590 0.1270∗∗∗ 0.0786∗∗ 0.1120
(0.052) (0.220) (0.005) (0.038) (0.112)
BAS -1.5700∗ -1.6600∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.000)
BAS × General CSI -0.0394 0.0312
(0.518) (0.277)
Size (×10−9) -0.1650 -0.0301
(0.355) (0.241)
Size × General CSI (×10−9) -0.0095 -0.0056
(0.544) (0.278)
Leverage -0.0093 -0.0097
(0.183) (0.136)
Leverage × General CSI -0.0013∗∗ -0.0010
(0.031) (0.185)
Market-to-book ratio 0.0023 0.0045∗∗∗
(0.138) (0.002)
Market-to-book ratio × General CSI 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0017∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.000)
Constant 3.1600∗∗∗ 4.0700∗∗∗ 1.8400∗∗∗ 1.3800∗∗∗ 2.2600∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
N 3,296 2,213 1,616 1,616 1,612
Adj. R2 0.039 0.032 0.324 0.335 0.390
Panel D: Non-life (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
General CSI 0.3290∗∗∗ 0.2480∗∗∗ 0.3330∗ 0.2590∗ 0.3550∗
(0.000) (0.006) (0.074) (0.067) (0.071)
BAS 0.3850∗∗ 0.4060
(0.035) (0.219)
BAS × General CSI -0.0425∗∗ -0.0259
(0.036) (0.330)
Size (×10−9) -0.3460 -0.1220
(0.144) (0.280)
Size × General CSI (×10−9) -0.0098 -0.0095
(0.105) (0.220)
Leverage 0.0151 0.0121
(0.323) (0.293)
Leverage × General CSI -0.0008∗ -0.0008∗
(0.072) (0.069)
Market-to-book ratio -1.9500∗∗ -1.8100∗∗
(0.015) (0.016)
Market-to-book ratio × General CSI -0.0372 -0.0563
(0.530) (0.400)
Constant 2.6900∗∗∗ 4.2500∗∗∗ 2.1900 13.6000∗∗∗ 12.9000∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.000) (0.239) (0.001) (0.000)
N 9,788 6,244 2,830 2,830 2,828
Adj. R2 0.110 0.112 0.113 0.271 0.288
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